The New International Architecture

In 1998 Rüdiger Dornbusch gave the Munich Lectures in Economics entitled “International Financial Crises”. The CES Academic Council awarded him the prize and title “Distinguished CES Fellow” for his outstanding work on the monetary theory of foreign trade.Rüdiger Dornbusch passed away on July 25, 2002, before he was able to finalize the manuscript of his most stimulating and thought-provoking lectures. The manuscript was scheduled to appear in the CESifo book series with MIT Press. This working paper contains the introduction which was distributed at the lectures. CES would like to make this document available to the scientific community. There is a video presentation of the lectures on the CES website (www.CESifo.de), and a leaflet is also available with the introductory speech by Stanley Fisher.International Finance, Financial Crises, IMF

International Financial Crises

Our friend and colleague Rüdiger Dornbusch passed away before he was able tocomplete his book based on the Munich Lectures in Economics that he gave inNovember 17, 1998, at the Center for Economic Studies of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität.The lectures contain a fascinating overview of the mechanics andhistory of international financial crises showing the breadth and ingenuity of thiseminent scholar. The lectures were lively and provocative, full of importantinsights and observations. Interestingly enough, Dornbusch expressed asubstantial mistrust in the actions of political decision makers, supervisoryagencies and central banks in the game that leads to the crisis and even collapse offinancial systems, and he advocated supranational supervisory actions as aremedy. CES has decided to prepare a transcript of the lectures, which are also available inthe Internet as full length-videos. I am grateful to Paul Kremmel for hisassistance.

A primer on emerging-market crises

노트 : - Volume Title: Preventing currency crises in emerging markets - Title: A primer on emerging-market crise

Malaysia: Was it Different?

In the Asian crisis of 1997-98 some countries followed IMF prescriptions for stabilization and recovery. Malaysia went another route, placing an emphasis on capital controls. Did this strategy work out to lower the costs of the crisis and foster a more rapid recovery as claimed by some observers and notably the Malaysian authorities? It remains to explore whether that claim is indeed appropriate or whether it is primarily domestic grand standing of a weakened and challenged leadership which uses the international issue to deflect from severe domestic political problems. In evaluating the Malaysian experience it must be understood that for this country two crises were unfolding simultaneously. One was the Asian financial crisis that brought down countries with vulnerable financial structures. The other one was the domestic political. The paper concludes that there is no evidence of a better performance and not surprisingly so. Capital controls were imposed after the crisis was over, as interest rates in all Asian crisis economies, including Malaysia, were already declining rapidly and as US interest rate cuts fostered a more stable environment.

A Primer on Emerging Market Crises

Over the past 20 years there has been a proliferation of emerging market crises and a vast accumulation of commentary -- descriptive, theoretical and applied -- highlighting the origins and mechanics of each crisis and of crises in general. And there is plenty of analysis on how to deal with crises both in terms of prevention and of cures. Is it possible now to distill from all this a simple set of propositions that summarize the experience and capture the chief lessons? This paper sets out a few propositions that summarize what is known and accepted. The interest in doing so is to promote a set of presumptions about what is unsound practice with a presumption that it cannot fail to engender, in time, a crisis. At the center of that discussion is the role of balance sheets. Moreover, crises are not just financial experiences but rather involve large and lasting social costs and important redistribution of income and wealth. That makes it especially important to secure agreement on what constitutes bad practice and identify areas of continuing controversy.

Fewer Monies, Better Monies

In the aftermath of emerging market crises from Russia to Asia and Latin America, there is a quest for better monetary arrangements that are more crisis-proof. Fixed rates are out, flexible rates are in with a policy focus on inflation targeting. But there is, of course, the alternative of abolishing exchange rates all together. This paper revisits the issue of dollarization or currency boards to review what arguments in the debate stand up. The case for flexible exchange rates emphasizes the need for a tool to accomplish relative price adjustment. This paper argues that in an intertemporal perspective most shocks require financing in the capital market rather than adjustment. Moreover, countries frequently do not use their flexible rate to play a cyclical role and, as a result, only a pay a premium for the option to depreciate but do not take advantage of the flexibility; on the contrary, they engineer systematic overvaluation in the context of inflation targeting.

A Framework for Exchange Rate Policy in Korea

The monetary policy and exchange rate regime that served Korea well for many years ended in crisis in 1997. The regime that collapsed was characterized by a tightly managed nominal exchange rate and domestic financial markets that were controlled by the government and largely closed to international transactions. The practical question for authorities over the next few years is what monetary and exchange rate regime will best promote the objectives of maintaining economic and financial stability as financial markets are liberalized. Our basic proposal is that the powerful policy tool, interest rate policy, be used to attain a "flexible" inflation target. Flexibility in this context means that the authorities also care about short-run fluctuations in domestic output and employment. The less powerful policy tool, sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market, would be used to limit day to day changes in exchange rates. We argue that the government should continue to be an important participant in the foreign exchange market but not attempt to establish a level for the exchange rate. Our proposal will involve intervention that is triggered by exchange rate volatility but constrained by an announced target for the government's overall net foreign asset position. The objective of this regime is to allow the government to participate in the foreign exchange market in a way that contributes to economic stability and promotes the development of the private sector's participation in foreign exchange and financial markets.monetary policy, exchange rate regime, Korea, government

Debt and Monetary Policy: The Policy Issues

The paper explores the implications of high debt for monetary policy. In Europe, debt (and deficits) play a special role at present in the run up to Maastricht because large debts are seen as a threat to the integrity of the new European money. The paper reviews two historical episodes-- the German, UK, and French experience in the 1920s and the US debt liquidation of the 1950-1980 period. The theoretical review focuses on hypotheses of Keynes, Clark and Sargent- Wallace. The paper adds to the range of concerns private balance sheet vulnerability.